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Abstract 1 
Health-care waste management requires technical, financial and human resources, and 2 
it is a challenge for low- and middle income countries, while it is often neglected in 3 
protracted crisis or emergency situations. Indeed, when health, safety, security or 4 
wellbeing of a community is threatened, solid waste management usually receives 5 
limited attention. 6 
Using the Gaza Strip as the case study region, this manuscript reports on health-care 7 
waste management within the context of a humanitarian crisis. The study employed a 8 
range of methods including content analyses of policies and legislation, audits of waste 9 
arisings, field visits, stakeholder interviews and evaluation of treatment systems. The 10 
study estimated a production from clinics and hospitals of 683 kg/day of hazardous 11 
waste in the Gaza Strip, while the total health-care waste production was 3,357 12 
kg/day. A number of challenges was identified including lack of clear definitions and 13 
regulations, limited accurate data on which to base decisions and strategies and poor 14 
coordination amongst key stakeholders. Hazardous and non-hazardous waste was 15 
partially segregated and treatment facilities hardly used, and 75% of the hazardous 16 
waste was left untreated. Recommendations for mitigating these challenges posed to 17 
patients, staff and the community in general are suggested. The outputs are 18 
particularly useful to support decision makers, and re-organize the system according to 19 
reliable data and sound assumptions. The methodology can be replicated in other 20 
humanitarian settings, also to other waste flows, and other sectors of environmental 21 
sanitation. 22 
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 35 
1. Introduction 36 
Palestine is divided into two geographical entities, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 37 
Although theoretically managed by the same government and regulated by the same 38 
legislative framework, they are de facto autonomous entities, and administered 39 
respectively by the Palestinian Authority (Fatah), and Hamas. In the Gaza Strip the 40 
situation is quite different from the West Bank. For example, the management of 41 
waste differs between the two regions (Caniato et al., 2015a). 42 
A number of studies have been conducted across the Middle East on waste 43 
management (Abd El-Salam, 2010; Aghapour et al., 2013; Alhumoud and Alhumoud, 44 
2007; Askarian et al., 2012; Bdour et al., 2007; Ciplak and Barton, 2012). More 45 
specifically, research has examined waste management in the West Bank (Al-Khatib, 46 
2008; Al-Khatib et al., 2009; Al-Khatib and Sato, 2009), some of which are focused on 47 
social factors such as the opinions of staff from health-care facilities (HCF) (Massrouje, 48 
2001; Sarsour et al., 2014). However, there are various limitations of these studies, 49 
including the fact that in some cases they refer to Palestine in general, some are based 50 
on quite old data, and there has been limited large scale study of the Gaza Strip 51 
specifically. 52 
Since Hamas reinforced its power in Gaza in 2007, there have been three large-scale 53 
conflicts with Israel. However, the 2014 war was the most deadly and devastating, with 54 
more than 2,200 Palestinians (mostly civilians) killed, and 11,231 Palestinians injured. 55 
On the Israeli side, 67 soldiers and six civilians were killed, and 1,600 people wounded. 56 
About 170,000 homes and 360 factories in Gaza were damaged or lost, key 57 
infrastructure hit, and thousands of acres of farmland were ruined (Schabas et al., 58 
2015). In a similar context access to and quality of health-care are a particularly critical 59 
issue, as well as the management of by-products, like the waste generated. 60 
Therefore, a study focused on the Gaza Strip is important and timely. Similar contexts 61 
are usually characterized by shortage of accurate and coherent data, and information 62 
is even conflicting or based on the personal opinion of different stakeholders. Using 63 
health-care waste management (HCWM) as the key focus, this study aimed to 64 
understand the management of waste during a humanitarian crisis and to develop 65 
effective recommendations to address the issues identified. It aims to show that is 66 
possible to overcome such challenges with a combination of different qualitative and 67 
quantitative methods in order to draw evidenced-based conclusions. 68 
 69 
2. Methods 70 
The Gaza Strip is such a small area that the national and local administrative levels are 71 
almost overlapping. The governorates and municipalities are very small and do not 72 
play an important role concerning HCWM. Thus the study was focused on the entire 73 
Gaza Strip. 74 
The analysis included the following topics: 75 
- Regulation, legislative framework and guidelines; 76 
- Background information at the Gaza Strip level (e.g. identification of available 77 
treatment options, market opportunities); 78 
- HCWM at the health-care facility level (rapid assessment); 79 
- Quality of HCW segregation and estimation of waste production; 80 
- Identification of stakeholders (role, importance, relationships, and 81 
communication networks); 82 
- Identification of challenges and evaluation of stakeholder priorities. 83 
Some methods were often applied together. For example, while assessing a HCF, staff 84 
were also interviewed, and questions about different topics submitted. 85 
 86 
2.1. Regulation, legislative framework and guidelines 87 
Some thirty officers from departments of the Ministry of Health (MoH), municipal solid 88 
waste (MSW) service providers, and staff from HCFs were interviewed to examine the 89 
regulations concerning HCWM. The research was extended to the guidelines and laws 90 
concerning public health and infection prevention and control (IPC), in order to have a 91 
picture of all the pieces of regulation potentially of interest. Some laws were officially 92 
available also in English, while the other documents were translated by COOPI – 93 
COOPERAZIONE INTERNAZIONALE (COOPI) staff. COOPI is an international NGO which 94 
acted as partners in the study. 95 
 96 
2.2. Background information at the Gaza Strip level 97 
One of the most complete databases about HCFs was developed by the World Health 98 
Organization (WHO) in April 2009 (WHO and EMRO, 2010). It provides information 99 
about each HCF, including utilization statistics, GPS coordinates, and health services. 100 
This information was used as the main baseline (Table 1). The data were checked as 101 
much as possible during meetings and visits, to confirm that they were still 102 
representative of the Gaza Strip situation. However, in some facilities, utilization 103 
statistics and other information were not easily available, and staff did not have the 104 
data. Therefore, it is possible that they were either collected with different definitions, 105 
or some facilities simply were not used to have a data recording system. It is important 106 
to note that official documents report different numbers of beds and bed occupancy 107 
rates (BOR) in MoH hospitals (Home Engineering Unltd et al., 2005a; Ministry of 108 
Health, 2011a; WHO et al., 2011; WHO and EMRO, 2010). Other information was 109 
collected from online documents, the MoH website, and interviews with MoH and 110 
WHO officers, HCF staff and local experts in 2011 and 2012. 111 
In the Gaza Strip, hazardous HCW were either incinerated or disposed of in a dedicated 112 
landfill. Qualitative and quantitative data about incinerators were collected with a 113 
simple form during field visits. All of the three incinerators in the Gaza Strip were 114 
visited several times, in order to understand the practices discussed with operators 115 
and the responsible officers. The hazardous waste landfill was visited as well, and its 116 
manager interviewed. 117 
 118 
2.3. HCWM at the health-care facility level 119 
HCFs were assessed adapting the 1st version of the rapid assessment tool developed by 120 
WHO & UNEP/SBC (2011). The 2nd edition was published in November 2011 only, after 121 
the first field mission in the Gaza Strip. Waste segregation was surveyed in different 122 
departments/wards in each HCF visited. Some 16 HCFs were assessed, 10 public and 6 123 
non-governmental respectively. Non-governmental HCFs were managed by private 124 
companies, NGOs or the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 125 
Refugees (UNRWA). The 16 HCFs were a representative sample from different 126 
governorates, and represent the vast majority of both bed capacity and patients 127 
treated in the Gaza Strip. 128 
 129 
2.4. Estimation of waste production and quality of HCW segregation 130 
In January-February 2012, COOPI staff carried out a rapid weighing campaign in four 131 
HCFs (two hospitals and two clinics), for six consecutive days (from Saturday to 132 
Thursday). This analysis aimed to quantitatively estimate waste production and waste 133 
segregation. Moreover, direct observation gave some qualitative indication of onsite 134 
collection and storage practices. Clinics had an internal collection shift (7.00–14:30) 135 
only, thus the analysis, carried out in the morning, covered the entire HCW production. 136 
Hospitals were operative 24/7 and had three waste internal collection shifts (6:00–137 
14:00, 14:00–22:00, 22:00–6:00), and COOPI staff could only weigh the first shift. 138 
However, the majority of waste was collected during this shift, which meant that this 139 
was representative of the overall quantities of waste. COOPI staff assessed the volume 140 
occupied by the waste by evaluating the percentage of filling of containers in use.  The 141 
day after, COOPI staff assessed the volume of the total HCW produced in the previous 142 
day before it was transported out of the hospital. This estimated volume was then 143 
used to determine the waste quantities, using sample weights of the waste for the 144 
conversion. Therefore, COOPI staff could estimate the total HCW daily production. 145 
Safety boxes were collected just once a day, thus this generation was the actual value, 146 
not an estimation. 147 
Also UNRWA kindly agreed to participate, and their staff weighed the waste produced 148 
by the Rimal clinic for eight days (19 October – 27 October, 2011, excluding Friday 21 149 
October), without the presence of COOPI staff. 150 
The effectiveness of waste segregation was assessed directly in both producer (HCF) 151 
and treatment/disposal site (incinerator, hazardous waste landfill and MSW landfill). 152 
Only two waste streams could be identified, namely: (1) waste managed by MSW 153 
service providers, and (2) hazardous waste treated by MoH with incinerators. In all the 154 
assessed HCFs, after interviews, some wards were visited, as well as the temporary 155 
storage sites in use for non-hazardous (i.e. similar to MSW) and hazardous waste. In 156 
the incinerator at Al Shifa hospital (the biggest HCF in Palestine), some bags and safety 157 
boxes were opened in order to qualitatively observe the contents before incineration.  158 
Mixture of hazardous and non-hazardous waste was observed in both the streams 159 
during all the field activities, and was confirmed by all the interviews. 160 
2.5. Identification of stakeholders 161 
Stakeholders and social networks were analysed based on Caniato et al. (2014b). 162 
 163 
2.6. Identification of challenges and evaluation of stakeholder priorities 164 
During meetings and interviews, stakeholders were asked to give their opinions about 165 
HCWM in the Gaza Strip, to state the challenges and the suggestions to improve the 166 
situation. A set of challenges was identified, and a possible way forward for each one 167 
was suggested, integrating requests from the field with indications from guidelines and 168 
literature. Stakeholders stated their priorities about HCWM, as described in Caniato et 169 
al. (2014b). A program of intervention was developed through the triangulation of 170 
challenges, possible way forward, and priorities. 171 
 172 
2.7. Site surveys and data triangulation 173 
Some 39 stakeholders were engaged with, covering all the categories, and providing an 174 
overview of the region, in particular general indications about organizational, logistical 175 
and legislative factors. Visits, direct observation and field discussion with operators 176 
contributed to investigation of practices. MSW management was previously assessed 177 
with a specific methodology (Caniato and Vaccari, 2014), thus the presence of 178 
hazardous HCW in street containers, transfer stations and disposal sites had already 179 
been detected. 180 
About hospitals, the main hazardous HCW sources, 12 out of 28 facilities (43%) were 181 
assessed, covering 70% of the bed capacity (1,886 out of 2,697) and 81% of patients in 182 
the Gaza Strip, according to WHO et al. (2011) (1,358,381 out of 1,685,265). This 183 
number of patients refers to the sum of admissions, outpatients and emergency room 184 
(ER) visits. Thus considering the number of beds, all the governorates, except Rafah, 185 
were well represented in the sample. 186 
Clinics produce a smaller quantity of waste per patient than hospitals (Pruss-Ustun et 187 
al., 2013), and hazardous wastes are mainly composed by sharps and infectious. Only 188 
four clinics, two owned by the MoH and two by UNRWA, were visited. Information 189 
about other clinics was directly or indirectly collected by the stakeholders met. 190 
Therefore, the sample was not completely representative of all the clinics, but 191 
information was consistent, and results were deemed reliable. Finally, the overview of 192 
HCWM was obtained through information triangulation from both meetings and 193 
stakeholder analysis. 194 
 195 
3. Results 196 
National level: analysis of regulation, legislative framework and guidelines 197 
At the time of the study there was no clear regulation about HCWM in the Gaza Strip. 198 
Only a few definitions (e.g. “hazardous substance” and “hazardous waste”) were 199 
provided by the Palestinian Environmental Law (President of the Palestinian Authority, 200 
1999), while specific terms like “medical waste” were left undefined. The 201 
Environmental Quality Authority (EQA) had the responsibility to define the activities 202 
and procedures for waste management in coordination with the specialized agencies, 203 
and to monitor law enforcement. In the National Strategy for SWM in the Palestinian 204 
Territory 2010-2014 (Palestinian National Authority, 2010), Strategic Objective Five 205 
dealt with medical, hazardous, and special wastes. In particular, the Authority aimed at 206 
creating an inventory and tracking system, and establishing suitable treatment plants 207 
for medical waste, though “... there are no Palestinian standards for dealing with 208 
special, hazardous, and medical wastes...” (Palestinian National Authority 2010, p. 5). 209 
Although not clearly defined, responsibility to manage hazardous HCW was generally 210 
attributed to MoH, while Municipalities and Solid Waste Management Councils were in 211 
charge of the non-hazardous waste, based on the Public Health Law (Palestinian 212 
Legislative Council, 2004). 213 
The law prepared in 2009 “Concerning the management and the handling of medical 214 
waste” (Palestinian National Authority, 2009) was still under approval in 2013. It 215 
included definitions, including “medical waste”, and “general waste”, a list of main and 216 
secondary sources, and responsibilities. Medical waste categories were defined 217 
similarly to the first edition of the WHO’s Blue Book (Pruss et al., 1999). Finally, the law 218 
gave general indications about segregation, collection and temporary storage, and 219 
onsite and offsite transport, while little was written about treatment and disposal. 220 
Due to the internal Palestinian political conflict, officers from the same Ministry (e.g. 221 
Ministry of Health) in the Gaza Strip and West Bank had little interaction, and 222 
practically were independent structures, with specific regulations, recommendations 223 
and plans. At the Gaza Strip level, Recommendations of the committee of the 224 
directorate of the medical wastes in the Ministry of Health, October 2010 (Ministry of 225 
Health, 2010) required the establishment of a committee to classify waste, to 226 
introduce an appropriate segregation system and to monitor its application. Medical 227 
waste incinerator situation in Ministry Of Health of Gaza, 5 October 2011 (Ministry of 228 
Health, 2011b) reported the existing situation concerning incineration in the Gaza 229 
Strip, and certified the lack of a segregation system, the old and poor condition of 230 
incinerators, and their risks to public health. Incineration run protocol (Ministry of 231 
Health, 2011c) set some general incineration procedures. Finally, some documents 232 
about IPC were officially present, like “Infection Prevention and Control Protocols” 233 
(Ministry of Health, 2004), but they were not being implemented at the time of the 234 
study. 235 
 236 
3.1. National level: collection and analysis of data and useful information at the Gaza 237 
Strip level 238 
Health-care was provided by both public and nongovernmental actors. Public HCFs 239 
were owned and managed by either MoH or military services in Palestine (MSP, also 240 
called Palestinian Military Medical Services PMMS), while non-governmental HCFs 241 
were managed by private companies and local or international NGOs. UNRWA ran its 242 
own facilities, providing primary health-care to refugees. In 2010, some 1,002,329 243 
people accessed UNRWA health services (UNRWA, 2011). 244 
HCFs were divided into clinics, which provided mainly primary services and dealt with 245 
outpatients only, and hospitals, which provided secondary and tertiary services. Public 246 
clinics had four levels according to the health services provided. Non-governmental 247 
facilities did not follow specific rules (Regional Health Systems Observatory and EMRO, 248 
2006). Table 1 presents the number of HCFs and main available statistics for each. The 249 
Ministry of Health (2011a) reported a different number of non-governmental hospitals, 250 
clinics and beds available. The lack of an univocal recording system, in particular 251 
regarding non-governmental HCFs is evident. 252 
TABLE 1 HERE 253 
The most recent data estimated a HCW production of 730 tonne/month in the Gaza 254 
Strip, but it was actually based on 2004-2008 surveys (PCBS, 2009). In 2011, the MoH 255 
estimated that incinerators burnt about 4.5 – 5 tonnes/month (Ministry of Health, 256 
2011b), but no weighing or reliable estimations were available about general HCW 257 
production and composition. The Master Plan for Healthcare Waste Management 258 
West Bank/Gaza Strip was the most up to date study and was still considered valid by 259 
all the stakeholders. It estimated a production of 2,003 kg/day (400 kg/day of 260 
hazardous waste) in 2004, considering 1.306 kg/bed/day and a BOR of 80% (1,534 261 
occupied beds out of 1,917) (Home Engineering Unltd et al., 2005a). The Feasibility 262 
Study for the Implementation of Healthcare Waste Master Plan in West Bank/Gaza 263 
Strip reported slight differences, but the estimation of hazardous waste production 264 
was similar (Home Engineering Unltd et al., 2005b). HCW was composed mainly of 265 
domestic waste (80%), while infectious waste was the main fraction of hazardous 266 
waste. This estimation was based on a questionnaire, some visits to HCFs in the Gaza 267 
Strip and a rapid sampling campaign. However, sampling probably was carried out for 268 
only one day, analysing just one UNRWA clinic and one blood bank, and with an 269 
unclear methodology (Home Engineering Unltd et al., 2005c). Therefore the data were 270 
not completely reliable. Most of all, the final estimation considered only hospitals and 271 
thus was based on waste production per occupied bed. Unfortunately, in the Gaza 272 
Strip the number of clinics and visits cannot be accurately verified. In 2000, the Quality 273 
Improvement Project, funded by the World Bank, estimated a waste production from 274 
hospitals of 800 kg/day, out of a total HCW production in Gaza Strip of 3,800 kg/day 275 
(DHV et al., 2012). Other studies, based on questionnaires or field activities, tried to 276 
estimate HCW generation and composition (El-Hawi, 2004; Kamel, 2011; PCBS, 2000; 277 
Qumboz, 2002; Zoarob, 1997), but did not provide a significant contribution to the 278 
analysis. 279 
Visits and meetings confirmed and integrated previous studies (DHV et al., 2012; El-280 
Hawi, 2004; Home Engineering Unltd et al., 2005b) about the poor HCWM standards. 281 
Indeed, infectious waste and sharps management were not regulated by specific 282 
procedures, while also those concerning pharmaceutical and anatomic waste were not 283 
completely implemented (Table 2). Regarding pharmaceutical waste, for example, 200 284 
m3 were collected and disposed in the only hazardous waste landfill of the Gaza Strip in 2010, 285 
though encapsulation procedure was not fully respected. In 2012, about 250 m3 out of 6,500 286 
m3 capacity of this landfill was filled (Solid Waste Director - Gaza Municipality, personal 287 
communication, 16/02/2012). Assuming a 0.9 density conversion factor valid in UK for both EWC 288 
code 180108 and 180109 – “cytotoxic and cytostatic medicines” and “medicines other than 289 
those mentioned in 18 01 08” respectively – (UK Environment Agency, 2014) around 180 290 
tonnes were disposed in 2010, and further 45 tonnes in the following two years. 291 
TABLE 2 HERE 292 
The three incinerators in the Gaza Strip were located in Al-Shifa hospital, in Gaza City, 293 
Nasser hospital, and European hospital, both in Khan Younis. Their performances did 294 
not meet international standards (Pruss-Ustun et al., 2013; SBC and UNEP, 2011; SSC 295 
and UNEP, 2009) in terms of operations (e.g. temperature, retention time, emission of 296 
pollutants) and staff safety (e.g. use of personal protective equipment, presence and 297 
application of an accident monitoring system). In addition, operation and maintenance 298 
procedures were neither written nor clearly defined. 299 
 300 
3.2. National level: rapid assessment of HCFs 301 
HCW management inside HCFs was often poor and potentially risky for patients, 302 
visitors and health workers. Table 3 presents a detailed picture of the situation in HCFs 303 
according to the health service provider. 304 
TABLE 3 HERE 305 
During the field visits, it was documented that in HCFs every HCWM step commonly 306 
met neither international minimum requirement (Pruss-Ustun et al., 2013) nor 307 
indications provided by local regulation. These non-compliances are reported in Table 308 
4, and it was the key starting point to improve the entire HCWM system in the Gaza 309 
Strip. 310 
TABLE 4 HERE 311 
 312 
3.3. National level: estimated HCW generation and quality of HCW segregation 313 
The two MoH clinics provided 135,035 and 161,962 visits (i.e. general practitioner + 314 
specialist visits) per year (WHO and EMRO, 2010). Their specific waste generation was 315 
similar, 0.022±0.012 and 0.027±0.010 kg/visit, respectively. The two clinics segregated 316 
safety boxes only, but the level of segregation was probably different. In the first clinic, 317 
a segregation of 8.2% weight per weight (w/w) on the total HCW produced was 318 
estimated, while in the latter it was 2.1% w/w only. 319 
Two MoH hospitals were assessed, Kamal Edwan hospital in the North governorate, 320 
and Al Shifa hospital in Gaza City. The first was a medium size hospital with 117 beds 321 
and an average production of 2.64±0.48 kg/occupied bed/day. The second was the 322 
largest hospital in the Gaza Strip with 657 beds and a much smaller waste production, 323 
0.91±0.10 kg/occupied bed/day. Infectious waste, segregated exclusively in safety 324 
boxes, on average was 2 kg/day (i.e. 0.8% w/w) and 10 kg/day (i.e. 2.0% w/w), 325 
respectively. Therefore infectious waste segregation per occupied bed was very 326 
limited, that is 0.025 and 0.018 kg/occupied bed/day, respectively. 327 
UNRWA staff weighed two waste categories, namely sharps and non-sharps. However, 328 
due to some confusion over the definition of “sharps”, all the infectious waste was 329 
considered as segregated. Based on this hypothesis, the average infectious waste 330 
production was 14.9±5.1 kg/day out of a total production of 67.6±11.3 kg/day, that is 331 
22% w/w. Using a total of 415,356 visits/year (WHO and EMRO, 2010), the average 332 
specific waste generation was 0.06±0.01 kg/visit, which was much higher than in the 333 
MoH clinics. 334 
During the weighing campaign it was evident that MoH HCFs segregated and collected 335 
only sharps, using almost exclusively carton safety boxes. Further field visits confirmed 336 
that at least some private and NGO HCFs were in the same situation. UNRWA had 337 
some infectious waste segregation procedures, but all the waste, both hazardous and 338 
non-hazardous, was collected and transported by the same truck and sent to the 339 
landfill together. However, official records at the Gaza Strip level were available 340 
neither about HCW generation nor segregation in 2012 (DHV et al., 2012). Ministry of 341 
Health (2011c) estimated that incinerators in Al Shifa, Nasser and European hospitals 342 
regularly dealt with 2-2.5, 1.5 and 1 tonne/month, respectively. Only data about 343 
incineration in Al Shifa hospital were confirmed by a record of waste burnt, with an 344 
average of 77 kg/day. Unfortunately, the incinerators in both Al Shifa and European 345 
hospitals were sometimes out of order. Therefore the Nasser hospital sometimes had 346 
to manage hazardous waste from all the HCFs in the Gaza Strip. 2011 data about Al 347 
Shifa hospital incinerator demonstrated that few HCFs sent hazardous waste for 348 
treatment. Indeed, only 15 HCFs regularly sent waste, totalling an average of 73±46 349 
kg/day, while other 10 HCFs were considered periodic or irregular sources, with a total 350 
supply of 4 kg/day (it was not possible to estimate the related standard deviation). 351 
Thus in several HCFs waste segregation was either ineffective or even absent, and the 352 
large majority of hazardous HCW was comingled with MSW. It resulted in more than 353 
75% of hazardous waste generated in the Gaza Strip being left untreated. This share 354 
was probably higher in reality because the overall production of hazardous waste was 355 
probably underestimated. 356 
 357 
 358 
3.4. National level: stakeholders, their roles, and relationships 359 
There were a number of stakeholders involved in HCWM with a complex network of 360 
relationships, as evaluated in Caniato et al. (2014b). Only MSW service providers had a 361 
clear picture of HCWM, while other actors, like MoH HCFs, WHO, private contractors in 362 
HCFs, EQA and health NGOs, had high interest but medium-low power. The MoH was 363 
both a regulator and manager of public HCFs, and in such a position was the only 364 
stakeholder with enough power to affect HCWM. However, it was also a very complex 365 
institution and lacked financial resources. 366 
The analysis evidently showed that technical staff dealing with HCWM suffered from 367 
the lack of a discussion platform to share practices, and develop appropriate solutions. 368 
Only official institution’s managers and representatives were usually allowed to 369 
communicate with other stakeholders, and it was particularly true especially for MoH 370 
HCFs. Finally stakeholders did not feel well trained about HCWM. Indeed, they had to 371 
rely on a few training opportunities, their initiative, and personal research using the 372 
internet. Only UNRWA staff reported having been trained specifically about this topic. 373 
However, guidance on HCWM, including training, experience sharing and pilot 374 
activities, were requested by almost all the stakeholders. Finally, it is remarkable that 375 
stakeholders gave little attention to the blockade imposed to the Gaza Strip since 2006 376 
or to the  difficult economic conditions due to it. However, a private hospital did report 377 
that sometimes buying safety boxes was more difficult and  importing treatment 378 
technologies was difficult and limited. 379 
 380 
 381 
3.5. National level: identification of challenges and evaluation of priorities 382 
Stakeholders self-evaluated HCWM in their facility, and tried to identify challenges and 383 
needs. Their indications were used to identify the global challenges of the HCWM 384 
system, and develop a possible way forward, including both procedural and 385 
infrastructural factors (Table 5). 386 
The stated priorities reflected the stakeholders’ knowledge and work. In particular, 387 
waste segregation at the HCF level, appropriate material for first storage and cleaning, 388 
and onsite storage were the most cited steps (Caniato et al., 2015b). 389 
 390 
4. Discussion 391 
4.1. Evaluation of the key findings 392 
The results suggest that HCWM varied across the different HCFs in the Gaza Strip. A 393 
number of challenges were identified including lack of clear definitions and 394 
regulations, limited accurate data on which to base decisions and strategies, limited 395 
coordination amongst key stakeholders, limited segregation of hazardous and non-396 
hazardous waste, limited training opportunities and treatment facilities that were not 397 
fit for purpose (and hardly used). These challenges posed significant risks to patients, 398 
staff and the community in general, as reported in several other low- and middle-399 
income countries (Caniato et al., 2015a; Liu et al., 2015; Ara et al., 2016; Thakur and 400 
Ramesh, 2015). 401 
Although regulation was lacking in several aspects, it was evident that existing laws 402 
were not well-known by all the stakeholders, and they were confused about what 403 
should be enforced and how. Regulations did not give clear indications about HCWM, 404 
but practices did not apply even what was suggested. Indeed, standard procedures 405 
applicable in the Gaza Strip for the management of each hazardous HCW, from the 406 
segregation to final disposal, should be developed. There are already a number of 407 
existing international guidelines which could be employed to provide definitions and 408 
guidance (e.g. WHO, 2014; UNEP, 2012). Given that, there are already various policies 409 
in place and, evidently, a key factor is also the effective implementation of any existing 410 
and new guidelines. As the key agency, the MoH should probably take at least initial 411 
responsibility for implementation and regulation. 412 
Several studies tried to describe HCW generation and composition, but none was able 413 
to give a reliable picture of the situation, and the gap of knowledge was still evident. 414 
For this reason verification and triangulation of data and information were considered 415 
so fundamental and received greatest attention. Nevertheless, all the hazardous waste 416 
categories should be better analysed and tracked from production to final disposal. 417 
Indeed, all the HCWM steps were not compliant with international standards and local 418 
regulation (e.g. Pruss-Ustun et al. 2013; SBC & UNEP 2011; SSC & UNEP 2009). 419 
Despite the limited data on HCW generation, a range of waste production of 0.9-2.7 420 
kg/occ. bed/day looks acceptable for the Gaza Strip and similar with other countries in 421 
similar economic conditions (Pruss-Ustun et al., 2013). However, there is a need for 422 
more accurate data on which to develop evidence-based policies and strategies. 423 
Moreover, data were largely estimated on the basis of data of other studies, like bed 424 
capacity, BOR and number of patients (Ministry of Health, 2011a; WHO et al., 2011; 425 
WHO and EMRO, 2010). 426 
According to the findings, UNRWA segregated about 22% of the waste, but then it was 427 
all transported and managed together. HCWM could be effective onsite with more 428 
effective segregation, with good results in terms of IPC. However, it was ineffective 429 
once the waste left the HCF, and was managed by the MSW service provider. 430 
Moreover, any waste segregation was almost nullified by mixing as soon as the waste 431 
was collected. In MoH clinics, waste segregation depended on the HCF size, and 432 
health-care services provided. A more effective segregation could lead not only to a 433 
reduction in public health incidences, but also to a reduced amount of waste to treat in 434 
the incinerators. A key factor in effective waste segregation and management is the 435 
provision of training, which was identified as a major concern by almost all staff. Given 436 
its importance, the MoH should take lead responsibility for developing training 437 
programmes for all relevant stakeholders. This could be done in conjunction with the 438 
international agencies (e.g. NGOs), that operate in the Gaza Strip. Some of these 439 
programmes should be made compulsory in order to improve the standards and 440 
procedures across both the health-care and the treatment facilities. 441 
It is particularly important to note that little attention was paid to the Gaza Strip 442 
blockade and the difficult economic conditions. Indeed, 30% of the population is below 443 
poverty line and unemployed rate  is among the highest in the World (CIA, 2016). 444 
Probably such a situation was considered as given, and all the stakeholders were used 445 
to coping with it. Moreover the difficulty in the importation of items was only limitedly 446 
reported. Indeed, health-care items are only partially affected by the blockade, 447 
including those useful for HCWM. Access to suitable treatment technologies would 448 
evidently be limited and constrained. However, during recent years none has tried to 449 
import any systems to the best of the authors’ knowledge. Finally the situation has an 450 
evident impact on HCWM, as all the aspects of people life in the Gaza Strip but with an 451 
indirect link, thus often neglected. For example, very few HCF staff can rarely attend 452 
training sessions out of the Gaza Strip, and the presence of trainers coming from 453 
abroad is strongly limited by the situation and depending on access permits. Therefore 454 
it is very difficult for HCFs to have clear references for inspiration. In general it is 455 
already hard to provide minimum standards of the service – especially during violence 456 
escalations – thus a complex issue as HCWM is rarely a priority for health-care service 457 
providers. 458 
Table 5 outlines some recommendations for overcoming the procedural and 459 
infrastructural barriers identified. These recommendations include the development of 460 
protocols and procedures, definition of roles and responsibilities, improved availability 461 
and conditions of consumables and vehicles, and identification of appropriate 462 
treatments and final disposal of waste. Given the particular complexity of working on 463 
HCWM in a humanitarian crisis, it is reasonable that only a few recommendations can 464 
be implemented in the short term. In particular the reason behind a crisis and the 465 
consequences cannot be affected by a waste management intervention and must be 466 
considered as part of the context. However, a picture of the main challenges and a 467 
clear way forward can support both local institutions and humanitarian organizations 468 
to identify priorities for intervention and planning, and facilitate coordination of their 469 
work. 470 
TABLE 5 HERE 471 
 472 
4.2. Developing a programme of interventions 473 
The production coefficients calculated for both clinics and hospitals were applied to 474 
utilization statistics. Indeed a production of 683 kg/day of hazardous waste out of 475 
3,357 kg/day total HCW was estimated for the Gaza Strip (Table 6). However, the study 476 
providing the unit production for hospitals did not give any error estimation (Home 477 
Engineering Unltd et al., 2005b). Indeed, these quantities appeared to underestimate 478 
production levels, because the number of beds in private HCFs was probably higher 479 
and BOR considered was smaller than other documents (Ministry of Health 2011a). 480 
Finally, none of the scattered sources was considered. According to these hypothesis, 481 
the production of 683 kg/day of hazardous waste should be mainly composed of 482 
infectious (80%, that is 16% of total HCW), sharps (15%, that is 3% of total HCW), blood 483 
and bodily fluids, and others. 484 
TABLE 6 HERE 485 
Considering the spatial distribution of HCFs, HCW production was concentrated in the 486 
Gaza City governorate, due to the presence of Al Shifa hospital. Hazardous HCW 487 
production from clinics was instead more regularly distributed (Table 7). 488 
TABLE 7 HERE 489 
Finally, the analysis allowed the development of a program of intervention, based on 490 
the field work and the system’s needs (Table 8). 491 
TABLE 8 HERE 492 
 493 
4.3. About the methodology 494 
The triangulation process of information from interviews, field visits, reports and other 495 
documents was effective. The large set of primary sources considered served not only 496 
to enable data reliability and validity, but also to provide background information to 497 
better inform further investigations. 498 
The approach to understanding regulation and HCWM at the Gaza Strip level enabled 499 
definition of the required detail for the HCF rapid assessment, as well as an analysis of 500 
key stakeholders. The rapid assessment gave a clear picture of public HCFs, and 501 
informed judgments of non-governmental and private facilities. Indeed, HCWM in 502 
these HCFs could potentially be different. However, the approach enabled an overview 503 
of HCWM without the need to survey all the producers. The stakeholder analysis not 504 
only helped identify challenges and priorities, but also completed the picture of HCWM 505 
practices. 506 
The estimation of HCW generation was difficult, due to the lack of adequate resources. 507 
Indeed Kamal Edwan hospital presented a large production per occupied bed, while in 508 
Al Shifa it looked more realistic. However, effective bed occupancy during any 509 
weighing campaign should have been considered, as well as other factors like hospital 510 
size, health-care services provided and specific level of management. Similar 511 
considerations should be applied to the data from the clinics. Utilization statistics and 512 
the estimations calculated were not particularly reliable due to the shortage and poor 513 
quality of data, as is typical for similar situations (e.g. Manga et al., 2011; Caniato et al., 514 
2015a). However, estimations of HCW coefficients gave a rough indication of total 515 
HCW production and hazardous component, and in particular demonstrated that a 516 
large quantity of hazardous HCW was mismanaged. Moreover it was possible to 517 
predict where the largest production of hazardous waste was concentrated. The 518 
triangulation of this data with the HCFs segregating at least part of the waste allowed 519 
identification of the main points of concern, and the development of the program of 520 
intervention. Although it was not stated directly by HCWM stakeholders, the program 521 
was based on their opinions and priorities. Therefore the process was implicitly 522 
participated and experience-based. It did not only identify some humanitarian 523 
responses, but suggested a holistic program of intervention which can address the 524 
HCWM system improvement for a certain period. Keeping the focus on both the global 525 
(i.e. the Gaza Strip) and the local (i.e. the HCF) level is the most appropriate strategy to 526 
achieve an effective and sustainable improvement of HCWM. 527 
Finally, such an in-depth data collection and triangulation process was necessary to 528 
draw a reasonably acceptable picture of the situation in the area of intervention, 529 
including some quantitative benchmarks. The extensive use of locally available reports 530 
and documents was mandatory, due to the lack of more reliable data sources. Even in 531 
the case of an intervention on a very limited area (e.g. a single hospital), such a process 532 
should be undertaken in order to provide the analysis with an adequate 533 
contextualization and set reasonable targets of improvements. In particular, the goal 534 
of conservation of resources requires knowledge of the context, including barriers, 535 
threats and opportunities. 536 
 537 
5. Conclusions 538 
At the time of the study, the Gaza Strip faced and continues to face significant social, 539 
political and humanitarian challenges. These challenges placed a strain on the 540 
availability of resources to provide effective services, including for HCWM. However, it 541 
is evident that there was a link between the management of HCW (and indeed waste 542 
in general), and the partial alleviation of some of these challenges.  For example, more 543 
effective management of HCW could lead to reduction in the public health and 544 
environmental risks posed not only to staff employed in the provision of health-care 545 
and management of waste, but also the community at large. A more sound 546 
management of HCW could also lead to a better use of resources, with an impact on 547 
financial performances of HCFs. The methodology proposed proved to be applicable in 548 
a humanitarian crisis. It could collect a large quantity of information, evaluate its 549 
quality and address specific analyses through integration of the data. In particular the 550 
need for additional analyses is reduced because they entail particularly relevant costs 551 
and risks for field staff in a humanitarian context. Recommendations were developed 552 
starting from the challenges identified, considering opinions and priorities of all the 553 
stakeholders involved and the resources actually available. While so many barriers 554 
have been identified, given the resource-strained nature of the situation, some of the 555 
recommendations suggested could be implemented at low or no costs (e.g. 556 
introduction of technical specifications and guidelines, and provision of training). In 557 
particular, in order for these benefits to be realised, it is important to improve the 558 
governance structures and coordination amongst key stakeholders within the Gaza 559 
Strip, including local and international organisations. Despite the major hurdles to be 560 
overcome, effective management of waste and resources during a prolonged and 561 
serious humanitarian crisis such as is the case in the Gaza Strip is possible, and can lead 562 
to significant environmental and public health outcomes. However, effective, holistic 563 
and coordinated strategies have to be put in place for these outcomes to be realised. 564 
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Table 1 – Hospitals and clinics in the Gaza Strip 671 
  672 
 673 
Reference 
HCFs 
WHO et al. 2011 WHO & EMRO 2010 
# of facilities # of beds # of facilities # of beds # of patients* 
Hospitals 27 2,697 28 2,697 1,685,265 
MoH 13 2,009 13 2,040 1,325,658 
PMMS - - 1 45 56,720 
NGOs 
14 688 
11 549 302,887 
Private 3 63 N.A. 
 
# of facilities 
Facilities 
with 
buildings in 
bad 
conditions 
# of facilities # of visits**  
Clinics 131 9 110 6,493,704  
MoH 54 9 56 2,735,716  
UNRWA 20 N.A. 20 3,449,316+  
NGOs 57 N.A. 34 308,672++  
N.A.: not available. 674 
*: # of patients includes admissions, outpatient and ER visits. 675 
**: # of visits includes general practitioner and specialized visits. 676 
+: data from 3 clinics are missing. 677 
++: data from 8 clinics are missing. 678 
 679 
Table 2 – Management of hazardous health-care waste categories in the Gaza Strip 680 
HCWM step Pharmaceutical 
waste 
Anatomic waste Infectious and sharps waste 
Definition 
and 
segregation 
MoH HCFs 
segregated parts of 
expired medicines or 
leftover without any 
clear criterion or 
specific procedures. 
Anatomic waste 
includes body parts 
and placenta and 
should be buried in 
accordance with 
Islamic practices. The 
waste was 
segregated, with 
different procedures 
according to the HCF. 
Waste considered infectious 
by HCF were segregated. Only 
some nongovernmental HCFs 
used colour coding. Several 
HCFs did not segregate 
infectious waste, or did it for a 
very small quantity. Sharps 
should be segregated in a 
safety box. 
Collection 
and onsite 
storage 
Pharmaceutical 
waste was stored 
without specific 
attention. 
Anatomic waste was 
collected and 
temporary stored in 
the HCF. Then, 
patient’s family  
collected it and 
provided for an 
adequate burial. In 
several HCFs, 
placentas could not 
be stocked properly, 
thus they were 
directly disposed in 
plastic bags with 
general MSW, 
sometimes with 
chlorine. Animals 
regularly scavenged 
for it in MSW 
containers. Body 
parts uncollected by 
families should be 
buried by the MoH, 
but this practice did 
not follow a specific 
procedure. 
Collection was usually carried 
out with the same trolleys for 
general waste and without 
specific routing. Safety boxes 
were temporary stored with 
infectious waste bags, 
frequently not in a dedicated 
room (e.g. generator house or 
entrance). 
Haulage General Directorate 
for Pharmacy within 
the MoH periodically 
collects from MoH 
HCFs and sends to 
Johr al Deek landfill. 
Hospitals and 
nongovernmental clinics had 
their own haulage system. 
MoH provided a monthly 
collection service, but without 
a fixed schedule. 
Treatment A small part of the 
waste was disposed 
in the hazardous 
waste section (it 
should be 
encapsulated in 
cement boxes, but 
they are simply 
stocked without 
proper closure), and 
the remaining was 
crushed and 
landfilled in the non-
hazardous section. 
Separation criterion 
were not well 
defined. 
3 small-scale incinerators were 
available, but a limited 
number of HCFs sent their 
infectious waste and sharps 
there. Others simply mixed 
such a waste stream with 
MSW. 
Residue 
disposal 
Bottom ash was mixed with 
MSW. Incinerators were not 
provided with air pollution 
control devices, thus fly ash 
was not produced. 
Quantity 
estimation 
No official data were 
available. 
No data were 
available. 
No clear data were available. 
Cost Collection and 
transportation costs 
were not available. 
Disposal costs were 
150 NIS/m3 (about 
39 USD/m3). 
No data were 
available. 
No data were available. 
 681 
Table 3 – HCWM in HCFs in 2012 according to the health service providers 682 
Step Aspect 
MoH 
hospital MoH clinic 
UNRWA 
clinic 
NGO 
clinic/hospital 
Private 
hospital 
Segregatio
n 
Written 
procedure 
No No Yes 
According to 
NGO 
N.A. 
Procedure in 
place 
Sharps 
segregation
, 
theoreticall
y infectious 
but rarely 
applied 
Sharps 
segregation, 
theoretically 
infectious 
but not 
applied 
3 categories: 
- Sharps 
- Infectious 
- General 
According to 
NGO 
N.A. 
Colour coding No No Yes 
According to 
NGO 
N.A. 
Bins 
Generally 
plastic 
Generally 
plastic 
Plastic Generally plastic N.A. 
Bags 
Poor quality 
plastic, not 
always 
present 
Poor quality 
plastic, not 
always 
present 
Plastic, 
according to 
waste 
typology 
According to 
NGO 
N.A. 
Collection 
Procedure 3 times/day 
1-2 
times/day 
1-2 
times/day 
According to 
NGO 
N.A. 
Workers 
Private 
company 
Private 
company 
Internal staff 
Private 
company/intern
al staff 
N.A. 
PPE 
According 
to private 
company 
According to 
private 
company 
Good N.A. N.A. 
Onsite 
transport 
Procedure No No No N.A. N.A. 
Method 
Trolley, 
cart, hand 
Trolley, cart, 
hand 
Trolley 
Trolley, cart, 
hand 
Trolley, cart, 
hand 
Temporary 
storage 
Hazardous 
(sharps) 
Various Various Various Various Various 
To landfill Container Container Container Container Container 
N.A. not available (information was not enough to determine a general practice) 
NOTE: Liquid waste from all the HCFs was directly disposed into the sewage system. Only a fraction was partially 
treated. 
 683 
 684 
Table 6 – Estimation of HCW coefficients and total production 685 
SOURCE ESTIMATION TOTAL PRODUCTION 
CLINICS* 
Total 
visits/year 
HCW 
(kg/visit) 
Hazardous HCW 
(%) 
HCW 
(kg/day) 
Hazardous HCW 
(kg/day) 
MoH 2,735,716 0.025±0.011 20% 187±82 37±16 
UNRWA 3,449,316 0.060±0.010 22% 567±95 125±21 
NGO 308,672 0.060±0.010 22% 51±8 11±2 
      SUB TOTAL 805±185 173±39 
HOSPITALS** Total beds 
HCW 
(kg/bed/d) 
Hazardous HCW 
(%) 
HCW 
(kg/day) 
Hazardous HCW 
(kg/day) 
MoH/MSP 2,085 1.3 20% 1,973 395 
Private 549 1.3 20% 520 104 
NGO 63 1.3 20% 60 12 
BOR (Bed Occupancy Rate) = 72.8% SUB TOTAL 2,552 510 
        
HCW 
(kg/day) 
Hazardous HCW 
(kg/day) 
    TOTAL PRODUCTION 3,357 683 
Scattered sources were not included. 
Error estimation of total production not included due to the impossibility to estimate it for hospital 
production. 
*: MoH unit production based on weighing campaign, and composition on Pruss-Ustun et al. (2013). 
UNRWA estimation was applied for both UNRWA and NGO clinics. Number of visits is based on WHO & 
EMRO (2010). 
**: Unit production and composition based on Home Engineering Unltd et al. (2005b). Number of beds 
based on WHO & EMRO (2010). BOR adapted from WHO et al. (2011): total BOR was calculated as the 
total beds occupied on the total beds available in MoH hospitals. Error estimation for hospital 
production was not available. 
 686 
 687 
Table 7 – Estimation of hazardous HCW production in kg/day and distribution per governorate 688 
CLINICS 
North 
Gaza 
(kg/day) 
Gaza 
City 
(kg/day) 
Middle 
Zone 
(kg/day) 
Khan 
Younis 
(kg/day) 
Rafah 
(kg/day
) 
TOT 
(kg/day) 
% 
MoH 7±3.1 15±6.6 5±2.2 7±3.1 4±1.8 37±16.7 22% 
UNRWA 21±3.5 43±7.2 29±4.8 8±1.3 24±4.0 
125±20.
8 72% 
NGO 2±0.3 4±0.7 1±0.2 4±0.7 1±0.2 11±2.0 6% 
SUB TOTAL 30±6.9 61±14.4 34±7.2 19±5.1 29±5.9 
173±39.
6 
100
% 
  17% 35% 20% 11% 17% 100%   
HOSPITALS 
North 
Gaza 
(kg/day) 
Gaza 
City 
(kg/day) 
Middle 
Zone 
(kg/day) 
Khan 
Younis 
(kg/day) 
Rafah 
(kg/day
) 
TOT 
(kg/day) 
% 
MoH 26 212 26 105 18 386 76% 
MSP 9 0 0 0 0 9 2% 
NGO 13 57 9 24 0 104 20% 
Private 0 12 0 0 0 12 2% 
SUB TOTAL 48 280 35 129 18 510 
100
% 
  9% 55% 7% 25% 3% 100%   
  
North 
Gaza 
(kg/day) 
Gaza 
City 
(kg/day) 
Middle 
Zone 
(kg/day) 
Khan 
Younis 
(kg/day) 
Rafah 
(kg/day
) 
TOT 
(kg/day)   
TOTAL 
PRODUCTION 78 341 69 148 47 683 
 % 11% 50% 10% 22% 7% 100% 
 Error estimation of total production not included due to the impossibility to estimate it for hospital 689 
production 690 
 691 
 692 
